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Few issues are more important to security studies scholars than understanding how violent non-
state groups innovate.  To shed new light on this subject, we examine Hezbollah’s innovations 
and the underlying processes that produced them.  Based on this case, the most successful 
violent non-state groups are arguably those that systematically pursue incremental innovation.  
Although less dramatic than their discontinuous counterparts, a commitment to steadily 
improve an organizations' tactics and techniques can have dramatic effects.  Indeed, even 
Hezbollah’s remarkable performance during the 2006 Lebanon War is attributable to the 
perfection of techniques utilized since the organization's inception.  While innovations were 
incremental in character, a bottom-up process of learning and experimentation by field 
commanders was critical to generating most of these innovations.  If generalizable to other 
violent non-state actors, these findings suggest that the most formidable insurgent and terrorist 
groups will actually be those that relentlessly pursue incremental innovations in a bottom-up 
fashion.   
 
Introduction 
Few issues are more important to scholars of security studies than understanding how 
violent non-state groups innovate.  Since the end of the Cold War intra-state wars and 
internationalized civil wars have outnumbered traditional inter-state conflicts by a factor of 
more than twenty-to-one.1  As a consequence, the outcome of most contemporary conflicts 
hinges on the relative abilities of state and non-state actors to innovate.  In locations as diverse 
as Iraq, Sri Lanka and Lebanon conventional armed forces and insurgents have engaged in 
deadly contests of innovation wherein each side attempted to develop new methods of inflicting 
harm on their opponent.  However, whereas innovation by state-controlled armed forces has 
long been subject to academic scrutiny, violent non-state groups’ innovations remain both 
understudied and misunderstood.  To fill this lacuna, we apply analytical distinctions developed 
from both academic works on military innovation and the broader literature on technological 
innovation to assess how violent non-state actors innovate.   
                                                          
1 Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen (2011) “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2010,” Journal 
of Peace Research 48(4), 525-536. 
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To this end, we examine in depth both the nature of one non-state actor's innovations 
and the underlying organizational processes that brought them about.  The subject of our study-
-Lebanon's Hezbollah--was selected based on its reputation as an exceptionally capable 
organization.  Unlike many comparable organizations, Hezbollah's continued effectiveness 
after a three decade conflict with a capable foe--Israel--suggests that the innovative dynamics 
at work are the product of the organization’s deeply-ingrained characteristics, rather than the 
mere chance discovery of an effective tactic.  In our inquiry we seek to answer the following 
questions: 1) are Hezbollah's innovations more discontinuous or incremental in nature; and 2) 
what are the respective roles of top-down and bottom-up dynamics in generating innovations. 
To preview our conclusions, the most successful violent non-state groups are those that 
systematically and effectively pursue incremental innovation.  Although less dramatic than their 
discontinuous counterparts, a commitment to steadily improve an organizations' tactics and 
techniques can have dramatic effects over time.  Such was the case with Hezbollah, where even 
the organization's remarkable performance during the 2006 Lebanon War can largely be 
attributed to the perfection of techniques (e.g. building tunnels, employing rockets and 
organizing anti-tank ambushes) utilized since the organization's inception in 1982.   
In addition to being incremental, much of the innovation uncovered was the product of 
a bottom-up process of continuous learning and experimentation by field commanders.  Critical 
to this process was Hezbollah’s leadership’s decision to devolve authority to field commanders 
and encourage them to seek better ways of inflicting casualties.  Within this context, the higher-
level headquarters--Hezbollah’s Jihad Council—played a critical role be ensuring that 
innovations developed by middle-level commanders diffused rapidly throughout the 
organization.  However, despite the preponderance of bottom-up innovation during much of 
Hezbollah’s existence, centralized, top-down processes have recently come to play an 
increasing role.  This change in innovation dynamics reflects the broader transformation of 
4 
 
Hezbollah’s struggle with Israel from one of continuous warfare, where cadres could regularly 
test new tactics against a ‘live’ adversary, to a more episodic conflict, where innovations must 
be developed under ‘peacetime’ conditions.     
 
Innovation and Armed Non-State Actors 
The study of innovation by violent non-state actors is an essential, yet under-developed 
area of security studies.2  Historically, scholarly inquiry into this area was stifled by the wide-
spread belief that armed non-state actors are inherently un-innovative.  When compared with 
the ability of state-controlled armed forces to develop capabilities that stretch the limits of 
contemporary technologies, insurgents’ repeated employment of certain basic techniques 
appeared distinctly unimaginative.  Superficially at least, groups fighting around the world 
seemed to be waging war in the same way and with analogous weaponry.  As a consequence, 
many early works on low intensity conflicts stressed the universality of the strategies insurgents 
pursued.  Noted terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffmann even went so far as assert that one category 
of non-state actor--terrorists--are atavistically conservative and unwilling to exploit new 
technologies that offer unambiguous advantages.3      
Because of preconceptions such as these, innovation by violent non-state actors has only 
recently been recognized as a field worthy of scholarly inquiry.  At base, the growing interest 
in non-state military innovation has been driven by the events of the past two decades.  Aum 
Shinrikyo's (1995) nerve gas attacks on the Tokyo subway, Al Qaeda's exotic suicide attacks 
(the 1998 embassy bombings and 2000 attack on the USS Cole) and the Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) war in Iraq all focused attention on how armed non-state actors innovate.  
                                                          
2 One major exception is: Gary Ackerman, ‘More Bang for the Buck’: Examining the 
Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New Weapons Technologies (Kings College London: 
Ph.D. Thesis, 2014).  
3 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia UP, 1998), 197-98. 
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Unfortunately, in their rush to be policy-relevant, many scholars concentrated their efforts on 
the narrow question of whether non-state actors could acquire and use weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), rather than the broader issue of how such groups improve their operational 
repertoires.4  Whereas the impact of WMD-equipped non-state actors remains largely 
hypothetical, the ability of armed non-state groups to engage in more prosaic forms of 
innovation is shaping the outcomes of numerous low intensity conflicts.  When non-state actors 
innovate, they can perpetuate and, in certain cases, prevail in their struggles with states or other 
non-state actors.  Contrarily, when non-state actors fail to innovate at the same rate as their 
opponents, they will be overtaken and defeated.   
In recent years, a small number of scholars have begun to systematically examine this 
broader issue of how non-state armed groups innovate.  Brian Jackson contributed to this field 
with both an article (2001) on how non-state actors acquire new technologies and a co-authored 
study (2005) on organizational learning in terrorist organizations.5  Paving the way in an 
essentially uncharted domain, Jackson articulated a "holistic" framework for predicting when 
terrorist groups will employ new technologies.  According to Jackson, innovation by non-state 
groups is a multi-stage process whose outcome is shaped by a range of variables, including: the 
degree to which groups are aware of outside trends; whether their leaders embrace or resist new 
                                                          
4 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999); Bruce 
Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and 
Motivations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Nadine Curr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face 
of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000); 
Jonathan Tucker, ed. Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); and Ian Bellamy, ed. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Responding to the Challenge (Abington: Routledge, 2007). 
 
5 Brian Jackson, "Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment 
Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption," Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 24/3 (2001), 183-213; and Brian Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 
1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating 
Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005). 
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ideas; how risk-accepting an organization is; the nature of the political and military environment 
where a group operates; a group's access to exterior sources of technological assistance; and a 
group's longevity.6   
While Jackson and his colleagues identified a wide range of factors that can contribute 
to innovation by non-state actors, the sheer number of variables they specify renders it difficult 
to ascertain what factors are most determinant.  Moreover, because no non-state armed group 
possesses all of the attributes that favor innovation, yet few are entirely bereft of innovation-
producing characteristics, it is difficult to employ Jackson's framework to predict either 
organizations’ relative innovativeness or the nature of the innovations that should be expected 
of them.7  For example, using Jackson's framework to calculate organizations' aptitudes for 
innovation generates such incongruous results as the Palestine's Fatah movement being more 
innovative during its 1970s heyday than Lebanon's Hezbollah was in the 1990s, or the Syrian-
backed As-Sa'iqa possessing a greater innovation quotient than the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (PIRA).8   
In an effort to identify the factors most critical to innovation, Adam Dolnik tested eleven 
variables derived from both Jackson's work and broader writings on military innovation against 
the empirical record provided by four armed non-state groups.  Ultimately, Dolnik's case studies 
                                                          
6 Jackson 2001, 189-202; Jackson et al. 2005, 9-26; and Maria Rasmussen & and 
Mohammed Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, 
and Predictive Indicators (Fort Belvoir: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2010). 
7 Jackson himself identified this shortcoming.  See Jackson 2001, 203. 
8 Employing Jackson's variable's, one would expect groups founded by technically-
educated leaders (Fatah's Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir were both engineers) to be more 
innovative than ones led by religious scholars, as in Hezbollah’s case.  Likewise, Fatah's 
leftist and modernizing self-image should have been more conducive to innovation than 
Hezbollah's religious worldview.  Likewise, As-Sa'iqa's state sponsor and greater tolerance for 
risk/losses should, according to Jackson, have rendered the organization more innovative than 
the PIRA, which was risk averse and lacked sponsorship.  The empirical record contradicts 
expectations generated by Jackson's framework.   
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led him to conclude that primary determinants of group innovativeness are: ideology, non-
rational attachments to particular forms of weaponry, and a high willingness to sacrifice group 
members.9  While Dolnik's systematic approach advanced the study of non-state group 
innovation, his selection of "innovative" cases limits the import of his conclusions.  Two of 
Dolnik’s three innovative organizations--Aum Shinrikyo and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine ─ General Command (PFLP-GC)--narrowly pursued technological 
innovation at the expense of articulating a coherent political-military strategy.  Consequently, 
neither organization was successful in the broader sense of obtaining more resources or 
inflicting significant damage on opponents.   
Indeed, Dolnik’s innovations are arguably cases of groups myopically pursuing 
technological sophistication rather than developing useable, albeit less dramatic, capabilities.  
For example, despite investing over $30 million in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, 
Aum Shinrikyo's sole attack killed only 12, yet precipitated the organization’s dismantlement.10  
Indeed, as numerous commentators remarked, Aum Shinrikyo would have inflicted more 
damage employing explosives or firearms rather than nerve gas.  Likewise, despite pioneering 
barometrically-triggered bombs and using motorized hang-gliders for attacks on Israel, the 
PFLP-GC never attained the same level of political relevance as technologically-conservative 
groups such as Fatah.11  Thus, while Dolnik demonstrates why specific groups pursued exotic 
technologies, it does not reveal when or how successful organizations innovate.        
                                                          
9 Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, tactics and global 
trends (London: Routledge, 2007), 147-79. 
10 Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo 
(Honolulu: Hawaii UP, 2000). 
11 Samuel Katz, Israel versus Jibril: The Thirty Year War Against a Master Terrorist 
(New York: Paragon House, 1993). 
8 
 
While Jackson and Dolnik sought to identify the factors endogenous to non-state actors 
that generate innovation, Daniel Byman and James Forest examined the role of sponsoring 
states and ungoverned territories in enhancing organizations’ ability to develop tactics and 
absorb technologies.12  Although these contributions explain why sponsorship and sanctuaries 
facilitate innovation, they fail to account for the varying effectiveness of organizations 
benefitting from such advantages.  For example, although a wide range of Palestinian groups 
benefitted from state sponsorship and foreign sanctuaries, the innovativeness and efficiency of 
the groups differed substantially.  Moreover, while foreign support and sanctuaries are clearly 
beneficial for armed non-state groups, their absence did not prevent groups such as the PIRA 
from innovating.13  Therefore, although state sponsorship may contribute to the innovative 
capacity of groups, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a group to innovate.       
In sum, while significant efforts have been made to examine innovation by non-state 
armed actors within the past decade, we are as yet far from possessing a persuasive theoretical 
framework for understanding either the forms of innovation that non-state groups are likely to 
generate or the factors determining groups’ relative innovativeness.  To advance the current 
state of our understanding of non-state military innovation it is necessary to employ theoretical 
distinctions and categories developed in the more mature fields of military and technological 
innovation studies, but rarely applied to violent non-state actors.  
 
                                                          
12 Daniel Byman et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2001); Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005); and James Forest, "Training Camps and Other Centers of 
Learning," In James Forest, ed. Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the 
Terrorist World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 69-109. 
 
13 A.R. Oppenheimer, IRA, the Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009). 
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The Innovation Problématique 
Contrary to innovation by armed non-state actors, the subject of how businesses and 
state-controlled armed forces innovate has long been subject to academic scrutiny.  Over the 
course of decades of analysis, two distinctions have emerged as critical for categorizing and 
comprehending how innovations are generated within these fields of human endeavor.  Within 
this context, innovations can be classified according to: 1) whether they are disruptive or 
incremental in nature; and 2) whether they originated through top-down or bottom-up 
organizational dynamics.  By applying these categorizations to successful violent non-state 
groups, via a process tracing analysis, it should be possible to develop a better understanding 
of when, how and why such groups innovate. 
Scholars of innovation have long differentiated between incremental and discontinuous 
innovations.14  Incremental innovation is a process whereby continued improvements enhance 
the efficiency of a product or procedure without altering its fundamental nature.  An example 
of incremental innovation can be found in the competitive efforts of armies during the First 
World War to perfect combined arms tactics.15  By way of comparison, discontinuous 
innovation involves the introduction of a new product or procedure whose impact transforms 
                                                          
14 Confusingly, scholars use nearly-synonymous terms to describe incremental and 
discontinuous innovations, including: continuous/discontinuous; sustaining/disruptive; 
incremental/transformational; single-loop/double-loop; and evolutionary/revolutionary.  See: 
James Utterback and William Abernathy, "A Dynamic Model of Product and Process 
Innovation," Omega 3/6 (1975), 639-56; Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, Organizational 
Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading: Addington-Wesley, 1978); James 
Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation (Boston: HBS, 1994); Clayton Christensen, 
The Innovator's Dilemma (Cambridge: HBS, 1997); and Terry Pierce, Warfighting and 
Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation (Abington: Frank Cass, 2004).   
15 Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical 
Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1981); 
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1994); Bruce Gundmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German 
Army, 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1995); and Martin Samuels, Command, Training and 
Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995).  
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the competitive dynamic characterizing firms or states.  Germany's development prior to the 
Second World War of panzer divisions and blitzkrieg tactics is an example of disruptive 
innovation insofar as it overthrew the existing linear principles according to which land warfare 
was conducted.16  Although discontinuous innovations are commonly perceived to be more 
dramatic than their incremental counterparts, in actuality either form of innovation can 
decisively shape states’ or firms’ destinies.17  As of today, no study has systematically examined 
which form of innovation is more characteristic of effective armed non-state actors. 
Distinct, yet related to the issue of whether innovations are discontinuous or incremental 
is the question of whether they are produced by organizational dynamics best classified as top-
down or bottom-up.  Top-down innovations are those initiated and directed by the upper 
echelons of an organization's leadership.18  For example, French political leaders’ decision to 
pursue an independent nuclear capability in the face of the hostility or indifference of military 
leaders is exemplary of top-down innovation.19  Bottom-up innovations are developments that 
arise from experience and experimentation conducted at the lower-rungs of an organization's 
formal hierarchy.20  For instance, the gradual development by US Marines of tactics, procedures 
and rules-of-thumb for fighting "small wars" during the 1920s and 1930s was a bottom-up 
                                                          
16 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational 
Theory (Abington: Frank Cass, 1997); and Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The 
British, French and German experiences," In Williamson Murray and Alan Millett, Military 
Innovation and the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 6-49. 
17 Mary Sanger and Martin Levin, "Using Old Stuff in New Ways: Innovation as a 
Case of Evolutionary Tinkering," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 11/1 (Winter 
1992), 88-115. 
18 Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies," Journal of Strategic 
Studies 29/5 (2006), 918-20.  
19 Maurice Vaïsse, La France et l'atome: études d'histoire nucléaire (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 1998).  
20 Grissom, 920-24. 
11 
 
process, led by junior officers and non-commissioned officers.21  Although military innovation 
scholarship traditionally focused on top-down processes, recent studies highlight the 
importance of bottom-up dynamics.22   
Similarly, most studies of violent non-state innovation--including those examined in the 
preceding section--focus on dramatic top-down innovations.  However, two studies suggest that 
bottom-up dynamics may be at least as important as their top-down counterparts.  The first of 
these studies, A.R. Oppenheimer's investigation of PIRA bomb-making demonstrates that 
middle-ranking operatives--the bomb makers themselves--shaped the organization’s tactical 
repertoire through incremental improvements in how they made and employed bombs.23  More 
counter-intuitively, Assaf Moghadam’s analysis of the September 11, 2001 plot reveals that 
bottom-up dynamics—particularly the roles of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Mohammed 
Atta--were critical to the attacks, which were hitherto considered a paradigmatic case of top-
down innovation.24  If groups as formidable as the PIRA and plots as unprecedented as the 
September 11 attacks depended on bottom-up innovation, then surely a wider range of violent 
non-state actors should be examined to ascertain the relative weight of top-down and bottom-
up dynamics. 
While the development of new technologies and tactics is one facet of innovation, 
equally critical are decisions about abandoning existing weapons and techniques.  In his seminal 
                                                          
21 Keith Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars 
Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder: Westview 2000). 
22 Grissom, 905-34; Theo Farrell, "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the 
British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009," Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 
(2010), 567-94; James Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War: Counterinsurgency 
Operations in Anbar and Ninewa 2005-2007 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011). 
23 Oppenheimer. 




work on economic development, Joseph Schumpeter argued that organizations can only master 
significant innovations if they are willing to change the technological and procedural paradigms 
upon which they depend.  However, if innovation is a process of "creative destruction", 
innovative organizations can only reinvent themselves if they are first able to selectively break 
with their existing routines.25  Invariably, it is extremely difficult for extant organizations to do 
this.26   
To develop their existing repertoire of tactics and technologies, organizations at some 
point shouldered significant fixed- and set-up costs and then perfected their skills through a 
process of "learning-by-doing."  As a consequence, the costs of an organization switching from 
one set of technologies or tactics to alternatives grows over time.27  For armed non-state actors, 
this means that significant innovations will likely only transpire when organizations possess 
mechanisms for evaluating and discarding parts their existing repertoires of skills and 
technologies.  Comprehending these mechanisms is crucial to developing a better 
understanding of how violent non-state actors innovate.       
To sum up, long-standing traditions of academic inquiry into military and corporate 
innovation offer conceptual distinctions and theoretical frameworks that can be fruitfully 
applied to the understudied question of how violent non-state organizations innovate.  Do non-
state groups strive for discontinuous innovations?  Or do they rather focus their organizational 
energies on incrementally perfecting existing tactics and technologies?  Do groups pursue 
innovations principally through top-down or bottom-up processes?  What motivates non-state 
                                                          
25 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 
1992 [orig. 1943]). 
26 Michael Horowitz, indeed, argues that young organizations are more likely to adopt 
innovations than older ones.  See Michael Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of 
Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” International Organization 1/64 (2010), 33-64. 




armed groups to abandon certain practices in order to concentrate on others?  Answering these 
questions will enhance our understanding of how violent non-state groups innovate. 
 
Case Selection 
The following pages will examine both the nature and processes of one violent non-state 
organization's innovations.  Because our objective is to explicate how successful non-state 
actors innovate over time, we focus on an organization considered one of the most formidable 
of its kind--Lebanon's Hezbollah.  In one of the most quoted assessments of Hezbollah, (former) 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage opined in September 2002 that "Hezbollah may be 
the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team."28  While Armitage's 
characterization of Hezbollah as a terrorist group is debatable, few would argue with his portrait 
of the organization's capabilities.29   
In fact, Hezbollah can even plausibly claim to have bested Israel's defense forces during 
three distinct conflicts, fought over three decades.  As a consequence, analysts have paid tribute 
to Hezbollah's capabilities and professionalism in a variety of ways.  Journalist Nicholas 
Blanford refers to it as "the Middle East's most powerful armed group", scholars Stephen Biddle 
and Jeffrey Friedman credit Hezbollah with pioneering a new "hybrid" form of warfare, and 
                                                          
28 Cited in Daniel Byman, "Should Hizballah be Next?" Foreign Affairs 82/6 
(November-December 2003), 55. 
29 Determining whether Hezbollah should be termed a terrorist organization is 
complicated by both the absence of a universally-accepted definition of terrorism and the 
difficulty in clearly attributing certain actions to the organization.  On defining terrorism, see 
Hoffman, 1-42.  For a detailed treatment of Hizballah, see Byman, "Should Hizballah be 
Next?" 54-66; and Judith Harik, Hizballah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2007), 163-75. 
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(former) CIA Director George Tenet categorized Hezbollah's global reach as a "notch above" 
Al Qaeda's.30   
Unlike many groups, Hezbollah's longevity and reputation for effectiveness render it 
possible to examine not only how non-state organizations innovate, but also to ascertain what 
factors lead certain non-state organizations to be more innovative than others.  In effect, 
whereas many armed non-state actors master certain technologies early in their existence, which 
they then apply in a consistent fashion over time, Hezbollah has engaged in three distinct 
periods of fighting, which were each characterized by distinct tactics and technologies.  
Moreover, although many observers credit Iran for Hezbollah’s effectiveness, available 
evidence suggest that the transmission of innovations has actually been the reverse of what is 
frequently assumed and that it is Hezbollah that develops tactics and then transmits them to 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.31 
Following the organization's emergence in 1982, Hezbollah fought other factions during 
Lebanon's civil war, while all-the-while employing kidnapping and suicide attacks against 
Israel and Western powers.  Following Israel's withdrawal to its so-called ‘security zone’ and 
the Lebanese Civil War’s conclusion, Hezbollah shifted tactics to conduct a hi-tech guerrilla 
war in Southern Lebanon between 1992 and 2000.  After Israel's retreat from its security zone 
in 2000, Hezbollah developed a territorial defense system combining technologically-savvy 
special forces, part-time urban warriors, tunnels and a panoply of unguided rockets.  Having 
                                                          
30 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: How Hizballah Became the Middle East's 
Most Powerful Armed Group (New York: Random House, 2011); Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey 
Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army 
and Defense Policy (Carlisle: Army War College, 2008); and Tenet cited in Byman, "Should 
Hizballah be Next?" 57. 
31 Marc DeVore & Armin Stähli, “Explaining Hezbollah's Effectiveness: Internal and 
External Determinants of the Rise of Violent Non-State Actors,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 27/2 (2015), 331-357; and Marc DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah 
Relationship: A Case Study of how State Sponsorship affects Terrorist Group Decision-
Making,” Perspectives On Terrorism 6/4-5 (2012), 85-107. 
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innovated as both a new social movement and a mature organization, Hezbollah should be able 
to teach us much about how institutions sustain high levels of innovative activity over time.        
Because gathering data on violent non-state actors is an inherently difficult, this study 
relies heavily upon primary sources and data collected during field research in Lebanon.  In 
addition to systematically examining published primary sources, we interviewed leaders from 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese Army, the United Nations' Peacekeeping Mission in Southern 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the rival Shi'ia organization, Amal, in an effort to understand how 
Hezbollah innovates.  During field research in Southern Lebanon, which has served as the 
epicenter for Israeli clashes with Hezbollah,  we also questioned local actors, including village 
mukhtars (headmen), grass-roots militants, peacekeepers and combatants’ family members.  To 
help evaluate our data, we spoke with academics and journalist that possess extensive 
experience with both Hezbollah and its Lebanese context.  Building on these sources, we have 
ascertained the nature of Hezbollah's innovations and pathways that enabled them to occur.  
 
The Struggle Against Israeli Occupation (1982-85) 
Beginning in 1982 a nebulous Shiite movement, later to become known as Hezbollah, 
started attacking the Israeli forces that had invaded Lebanon in June of that year.  Unlike many 
inchoate armed groups, Hezbollah’s actions were not characterized by amateurism or 
incompetence.  Rather they achieved strategic results in their first years of existence, persuading 
a Euro-American peacekeeping force to abandon Lebanon and contributed to Israel’s 
withdrawal to a narrow “security zone” in Southern Lebanon.  These successes were achieved 
through the effective application of three basic tactics: irregular/guerrilla attacks, suicide car 
bombings and kidnapping foreigners.  As will be demonstrated, Hezbollah was able to conduct 
these operations thanks to the skills that its founding military cadres brought to the organization 
from the institutions they had formerly served.  Within this context, Hezbollah’s main 
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accomplishment was creating an environment where the organization’s combatants could 
incrementally improve their skills via a process of decentralized innovation.   
To understand Hezbollah’s early success and subsequent development one must 
examine its military cadres’ backgrounds.  Because Lebanon’s Shiites had been historically 
marginalized by its Christian and Sunni communities, they were comparatively late to develop 
confessional political parties.32  However, the tumultuous nature and episodic violence of 
Lebanese politics created incentives for Shiites to join armed groups.  Beginning in the 1950s, 
many joined radical, secular parties opposed to Lebanon’s status quo, such as the Syrian Social 
Nationalist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party and Lebanon’s two Ba’ath Parties, all of 
which developed clandestine militias.33   
Later from the late 1960s onwards, many more Shiites joined armed Palestinian groups.  
Having obtained de facto authority over much of southern Lebanon from the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement, the PLO became the dominant force over much of Lebanon’s Shiite heartland.  
Wealthy and well-armed, the PLO recruited large numbers of Shiites into both its own ranks 
and those of closely-allied Lebanese militias.34  Indeed, during interviews we conducted in 
southern Lebanon, we discovered that most Shiite families counted at least one male relative 
who had fought for the Palestinians.35  Some Shiites attained considerable expertise and 
responsibility within Palestinian organizations.  For example, the future head of Hezbollah’s 
                                                          
32 Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi’a. Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1987), 16-23. 
33 Ibid, 33-38. 
34 Yonah Alexander & Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: C. 
Russak, 1989), 30-37. 
35 Interviews conducted in Southern Lebanon, April 2011. 
17 
 
intelligence and security service, Husayn al-Khalil, was a prominent operative for Fatah.36  
Even more significantly, the future leader of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council, Imad Mughniyah, was 
personally trained by a renowned Palestinian terrorist and former confederate of Ilich Ramirez 
Sanchez (aka. Carlos the Jackal) and rose to command a Shiite unit within Palestinian leader 
Yasser Arafat’s elite Force 17.37    
The first explicitly Shiite politico-military movement emerged in the late-1960s and 
early-1970s thanks to the efforts of the Iranian-born scion of one of Shiism’s premier clerical 
families, Imam Musa as-Sadr.38  Beginning in 1958, as-Sadr promoted social justice and 
combated economic inequalities afflicting Lebanon’s Shiite and non-Shiite inhabitants.  To this 
end, he co-founded the “Movement of the Deprived” with a Greek Catholic archbishop.  
However, the ominous tone of Lebanese politics in the mid-1970s led as-Sadr to create a militia 
to defend Shiite interests.  Recognizing that Lebanon’s Shiites were late to establish 
paramilitary structures, as-Sadr convinced the PLO to train his militia, which became known 
as Amal (short for Afwaj al Muquwamah al-Lubnaniyah).39  Ultimately, the school teacher 
Husayn al-Musawi rose to command this militia before later defecting to Hezbollah.40 
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Once Lebanon’s Civil War began in 1975, Shiites acquired practical military experience 
in a conflict that killed 100,000 Lebanese even before Israel’s 1982 invasion.  For example, 
while Palestinian-affiliated Shiites launched rocket attacks on Israel and opposed Israel’s 1978 
and 1982 invasions, Amal’s Shiites first fought alongside the Palestinians against Christian 
militias and then fought the Palestinians for control of southern Lebanon.  Although often on 
opposing sides in the Civil War, events between 1978 and 1982 brought veteran Shiite fighters 
from Amal and Palestinian groups together to serve a new movement that adhered to the 
Islamist political vision promoted by the Iranian Revolution.  The disappearance of Amal’s 
founder, as-Sadr, during a 1978 voyage to Libya led to the organization falling under the sway 
of an ambitious lawyer, Nabih Berri.  This development alienated Amal’s more religious 
members, who increasingly saw the Islamic regime imposed by Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini as their political model.41   
While Sadr’s disappearance and Khomeini’s rise undermined Amal’s status as 
Lebanon’s Shiite party par excellence, Israel’s 1982 invasion laid the groundwork for the 
emergence of a more militant organization.  By defeating and driving into exile the Palestinian 
groups that controlled southern Lebanon, the Israelis left the Shites who had fought alongside 
these groups unemployed and footloose.  Meanwhile, Amal, too, came apart when its leader, 
Berri, joined the ‘Committee of National Salvation,’ formed by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis 
to negotiate with the Israelis.  This decision to bargain with, rather than fight against, the 
invading Israelis prompted 500 Amal members, under the leadership of Hussein al-Musawi, to 
defect to form Islamic Amal, which became one of Hezbollah’s building blocks.42 
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Exploiting these events, pro-Iranian Lebanese clerics sought Iran’s assistance to create 
an anti-Israeli Shiite movement uniting Amal dissidents, veterans of Palestinian groups and 
activists from several small Islamist movements.43  Iran responded positively to these entreaties, 
negotiating an accord with Syria that permitted it to send 5,000 (quickly reduced to 1,500 and 
then 300) members of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to Lebanon’s Beka’a 
Valley in July 1982.  Initially unarmed, the IRGC personnel spread propaganda and worked to 
federate Shiites opposed to Israel.44  These efforts galvanized nine representatives of Shiite 
organizations, including three from Islamic Amal, to agree on a common platform calling for 
jihad against Israel and adherence to the Iranian doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (rule of the supreme 
jurist).  Following the adoption of this document—often referred to as Hezbollah’s founding 
act—the nine established a permanent committee (Shura) to oversee their anti-Israeli struggle.45 
Soon thereafter, Iranian money flowed into the Beka’a through the IRGC’s hands.  
These financial resources, in turn, proved catalytic to Hezbollah’s growth.  Hezbollah’s ability 
to pay salaries of $150-200 per month attracted fighters formerly employed by Amal and 
Palestinian groups, enabling Hezbollah to expand to 7,000 combatants within several years.46  
Amongst these recruits was Mughniyah, who brought with him Shiite veterans from Arafat’s 
Force 17, and al-Khalil, who founded Hezbollah’s internal security service.47 
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Staffed with combat veterans, Hezbollah began launching attacks on Israel and Western 
targets.  Unlike other violent non-state organizations, Hezbollah’s early actions soon bore 
strategic fruit, convincing Israel to withdraw from much of Lebanon in 1985 and curtailing 
American and Western European influence in that country.  Although some analysts credit 
IRGC advice for these results, an analysis of Hezbollah’s three principal tactics—
irregular/guerrilla warfare, suicide car bombings and hostage taking—reveals that Hezbollah’s 
success depended on its cadres’ ability to build upon skills they already possessed in an 
incremental and decentralized fashion.  
Irregular/guerrilla warfare tactics such as ambushes and ‘hit and run’ attacks were vital 
to Hezbollah’s development and accounted for two-thirds of the Israeli soldiers it killed 
between 1983 and 1985.48  However, Hezbollah’s early efforts to conduct such attacks were 
handicapped by the IRGC’s advisors, who initially sought to impose their ‘human wave’ tactics.  
With little formal military training, yet able to raise thousands of volunteers each year, the 
IRGC’s signature tactic during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was launching mass infantry 
assaults on fortified positions.49  Although inappropriate for use against Israel’s well-trained 
conventional army, the IRGC trained Hezbollah’s first two intakes of 150 recruits to conduct 
human wave attacks.50  As a result, Hezbollah launched several such attacks on isolated Israeli 
positions, which invariably failed to accomplish their objectives.  As one seasoned UN official 
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observed, "They [Hezbollah] were very amateur, foolhardy in many ways, but very brave. They 
just walked into the line of fire and were cut down very badly. It was just like watching the 
Iranian assaults against Iraq."51     
The heavy casualties and negligible results generated by human wave attacks provoked 
Hezbollah’s military cadres to embark on a tactical ‘revolution from below’.  In a decentralized 
fashion, individual Hezbollah commanders discarded IRGC tactics and reverted to the tactical 
formulae they knew from the Lebanese Civil War, which featured small semi-autonomous 
combat groups and such irregular/guerrilla warfare tactics as ambushes and ‘hit and run’ 
attacks.  In southern Lebanon it was the veteran militant Sheikh Ragheb Harb who led the way 
organizing fighters into self-contained groups of 5-6 combatants and instructing them to fight 
as guerrillas.  Elsewhere, veterans of Amal or Palestinian groups spearheaded the 
transformation from mass attacks to small combat groups.52 
This return to Civil War’s tactics improved Hezbollah’s performance almost 
immediately.  By December 1983 Israeli soldiers began to fall victim to complex ambushes, 
wherein Hezbollah combat teams attacked their patrols with grenades and automatic weapons.53  
Hezbollah also employed small units to assassinate Lebanese discovered collaborating with 
Israeli intelligence, thereby preventing the Israelis from establishing an adequate human 
intelligence network.54  Because of its own growing effectiveness and of Israel’s inability to 
anticipate its actions, Hezbollah constantly increased the pace of its operations such that, by 
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mid-1984, it was conducting 100 attacks per month.55  In Hezbollah’s own quasi-official 
history, Vice-Secretary General Na’im Qassem emphasized the collective impact of “ordinary 
operations conducted daily with explosive charges, ambushes, sniping and many other 
means.”56  Thus, Hezbollah built in a decentralized fashion on the irregular/guerrilla techniques 
its founders brought to it to engage Israel in a protracted war. 
Although Hezbollah’s embrace of small combat groups and irregular/guerrilla warfare 
tactics was initially led by individual field commanders, their measures diffused throughout the 
organization via the informal ties uniting local commanders.  Once Hezbollah’s higher-level 
leadership was convinced of the superiority of the organization’s autochthonous tactics, based 
on Civil War experience, over those imposed by the IRGC, they also insisted that Hezbollah 
cadres gradually replace Iranian instructors in the management of Hezbollah’s training camps.57  
Indeed, within time, Hezbollah’s fighters were not only conducting all training within Lebanon, 
but also overseeing specialized courses held in Iran.  Reflecting on this inversion of the original 
relationship between Hezbollah and the IRGC, one analyst observed that, “Hizballah trains Iran, 
not the other way around.”58 
While irregular/guerrilla tactics were critical to Hezbollah’s success, the tactic that won 
it the greatest publicity and disconcerted its opponents most was the use of suicide car bombs.  
In many respects, Hezbollah’s precocious development of suicide attacks was an incremental 
improvement on traditional Lebanese car bomb attacks.  First introduced into Lebanon in 1972, 
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car bombs became a notable feature of the Lebanese Civil War in the late-1970s.59   Because of 
their mobility, ubiquity and carrying capacity, automobiles proved an efficient means of 
surreptitiously delivering explosives to high-value targets.  As a consequence, all of Lebanon’s 
militias adopted them as a means to destroy their rivals’ headquarters, kill their leaders and 
terrorize their neighborhoods.60  In total, Lebanon’s warring factions detonated over 245 car 
bombs during the 15-year war.61 
Lebanon’s Shiites innovated on Lebanon’s traditional car bombs by inserting drivers 
desiring martyrdom into the explosives-laden vehicles, thereby enhancing their ability to 
deliver heavy explosives against both secure and mobile targets.  Within this context, a small 
Lebanese Shiite organization, the ad-Da’wa group, conducted the world’s first suicide car bomb 
attack in December 1981.62  Although ad-Da’wa merged into Hezbollah in 1982, its militants 
did not play a direct role in Hezbollah’s first suicide attack.63  Rather it was the Fatah-veteran 
Mughniyah who orchestrated the attack on his own initiative, which destroyed Israel’s military 
headquarters in Tyre in November 1982 and killed 75 Israelis.64  Tellingly, both Mughniya and 
ad-Da’wa built their suicide car bombs using a distinct characteristic of Lebanese car bombs—
using gas-cylinders to accelerate their detonation.65 
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The pace of Hezbollah’s suicide attacks increased as knowledge about them diffused 
informally amongst the organization’s cadres.  Whereas 1981 and 1982 featured one suicide 
car bomb attack apiece, 1983 witnessed four, the bulk of which were masterminded by a 
combination of former Amal cadres (Husayn al-Musawi) and former ad-Da’wa personnel 
(Abbas al-Musawi).66  Beginning in 1984, the geographical distribution of suicide attacks also 
expanded beyond Beirut and Tyre to embrace all of Israeli-occupied Lebanon.  Henceforth, 
Israeli soldiers were equally at risk of falling victim to suicide bombers in outposts near the 
Israeli border as teeming Lebanese metropolises further north.  Figure 1, below, illustrates 
Hezbollah’s evolving suicide car bomb campaign. 
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Table 1: Hezbollah Suicide Attacks 
Date Target Event 
11.11.1982 Israeli Military Headquarters, Tyre 75 Israeli soldiers and 15 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners 
killed; 28 Israelis wounded.67 
23.10.1983 U.S. Marine Barracks, Beirut 241 American military personnel killed 
23.10.1983 French Paratroop Barracks, Beirut 58 French paratroopers killed 
04.11.1983 Israeli Military Intelligence Post, Tyre 28 Israeli soldiers and 35 Lebanese and Palestinians killed.68 
10.03.1985 Military Command Post, Khiam 12 Israeli soldiers killed; 14 Israelis wounded.69 
19.08.1988 Military Motorcade, Tall an-Nahas 3 Israeli soldiers wounded.70 
19.10.1988 Convoy, Kfar Kila 7 Israeli soldiers killed; 8 Israelis and 2 Lebanese wounded.71  
09.08.1989 Motorcade, al-Qalia 5 Israeli soldiers wounded.72  
25.04.1995 Infantry patrol, al-Jarmaq, Bint 
Jubayyil 
12 Lebanese, 9 Israeli soldiers and 1 SLA militiaman 
wounded.73  
20.03.1996 Israeli convoy, Taibeh 1 Israeli soldier killed; 7 Israeli soldiers wounded.74 
30.12.1999 Car Bomb near an Israeli Army Patrol 1 Israeli soldier and 13 Lebanese wounded.75 
 
Hezbollah’s suicide attacks disconcerted its opponents.  Stunned by the loss of 299 
American Marines and French paratroopers in two 1983 suicide car bomb attacks, American 
                                                          
67 Associated Press, December 11, 1982. 
 
68 Associated Press, November 4, 1983. 
 
69 Associated Press, March 10, 1985. 
 
70 Associated Press, August 19, 1988; United Press International, August 19, 1988. 
 
71 Associated Press, October 22, 1988. 
 
72 Associated Press, August 14, 1989; United Press International, August 9, 1989. 
 
73 Associated Press, April 25, 1995. 
 
74 Associated Press, March 20, 1996; Agence France Press, March 21, 1996. 
 




and Western European governments withdrew the 5,000 soldiers of the Multinational Force that 
had deployed to Lebanon the previous year.  Unwilling to withdraw so quickly, Israel responded 
to suicide car bomb attacks with improved security at its headquarters.  However, Hezbollah 
innovatively responded to these countermeasures by developing techniques for conducting 
suicide attacks against Israeli patrols and logistics motorcades.  Compared with earlier attacks, 
these attacks—conducted from 1988 onwards—depended on up-to-date intelligence about 
Israeli movements and Hezbollah’s training suicide bombers capable of maneuvering their car 
bombs close to moving, hostile targets.  Nevertheless, further Israeli countermeasures, 
including the increased convoy security and the use of helicopters for logistical purposes, meant 
that Hezbollah’s suicide attacks yielded diminishing returns (illustrated in Figure 1) despite 
their increasing complexity.  
Figure 1: Israeli Military Victims of Hezbollah Suicide Attacks 
 
Aware that continual improvements to Hezbollah’s suicide bombing procedures could 
not reverse the tactic’s declining effectiveness, Hezbollah’s military leadership gradually 













publicly in 1996, arguing that high-value military targets were rarely vulnerable to suicide 
attacks and that lower-value targets could not justify the sacrifice of trained fighters.76 
Even as Hezbollah cadres developed suicide attacks as an incremental improvement on 
Lebanese car bombs, they were also creatively adapting traditional Lebanese kidnapping 
procedures to the new organization’s requirements.  Kidnappings were common during 
Lebanon’s Civil War and at least 13,968 Lebanese were abducted during the conflict.77  
Although the vast majority of kidnapping victims were Lebanese, nine foreigners had been 
abducted prior to Hezbollah’s creation.78  Both economic and strategic incentives motivated 
kidnappers, who extracted monetary ransoms and political concessions in exchange for 
hostages’ liberation.  The kidnappers, for their part, relied on family networks to preserve their 
security and operated in a decentralized fashion.79  As a consequence, the country’s major 
militias plausibly denied responsibility for kidnappings that served their interests and 
abductees’ allies faced difficulties mounting rescue operations. 
According to informed observers, members of preexisting Shiite kidnapping networks 
were amongst Hezbollah’s early recruits and certain Hezbollah cadres therefore considered 
kidnapping a viable tactic from the organization’s beginnings.  Within this context, the contours 
of Hezbollah’s foreign hostage-taking campaign gradually emerged as cadres identified 
objectives that kidnappings might fulfill.  Hezbollah’s sponsor, Iran, played a major role in this 
process, viewing foreign hostages as bargaining chips for first obtaining the liberation of Iranian 
diplomats that had ‘disappeared’ in northern Lebanon in 1982 and, later, as a means of 
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extracting concessions from Western governments.80  As an organization, Hezbollah also had 
an interest in hostage-taking because of the ransoms that could be obtained and their expectation 
that kidnappings would curtail Western diplomats’ and intelligence agents’ activities by driving 
foreign expatriates from Lebanon.81  Finally, individual Hezbollah cadres had personal reasons 
for taking hostages, with Mughniya and Husayn al-Musawi intent on freeing relatives from 
Kuwaiti jails, and Mughniya also committed to freeing his Palestinian terrorist mentor from a 
French jail.82 
Motivated by this complex nexus of objectives, Hezbollah-affiliated kidnapping 
networks systematically abducted expatriates from countries Iran and Hezbollah wanted to 
influence.  Overall, Hezbollah’s networks kidnapped 87 American and European expatriates, 
with the hostage-taking climaxing in 1984-86.  To conceal Hezbollah’s role, the organization 
relied on the same decentralized structures, based on family networks, characteristic of Civil 
War-era kidnappings.  Rather than advertising their affiliation with Hezbollah, these networks 
employed 17 different aliases.83  As a result, Western governments were never entirely sure 
whether a kidnapping was Hezbollah’s work or a ‘rogue’ operation conducted by unaffiliated 
Shiites.84  However, despite their denying any responsibility for the kidnappings, the Shiite and 
Islamist character of the hostage-taking networks left Hezbollah and Iran the only actors that 
could plausibly obtain hostages’ release.   
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As a result, Hezbollah and Iran reaped the political and economic advantages of hostage-
taking, without suffering significant negative consequences.  For example, Hezbollah obtained 
large ransom payments and drove many Western states to prohibit their citizens from travelling 
to Lebanon.85  Meanwhile, Iran coerced the United States into selling it weaponry and 
compelled France to expel opposition politicians.86  However, the very decentralization of 
Hezbollah’s kidnapping campaign rendered it difficult for the organization to terminate the so-
called hostage crisis when it wanted to do so.  Individual kidnapping networks refused to release 
their hostages until their individual demands were met in addition to Hezbollah’s overall 
demands, and negotiations over hostages were slowed by the competing agendas of Iran, 
Hezbollah’s leadership and the individual kidnapping networks.87  Consequently, it was not 
until 1991, several years after Hezbollah had wanted to resolve the hostage crisis, that the last 
foreign hostages were released.   
In sum, Hezbollah’s founding cadres’ ability to build on Lebanese Civil War tactics in 
an incremental and decentralized fashion had far-reaching political ramifications by the mid-
1980s.  Harassment by Hezbollah’s irregular/guerrilla warfare and the psychological shock of 
its suicide car bombs contributed to Israeli leaders’ decision to withdraw from most of the 
Lebanese territory they occupied in 1985.88  Meanwhile, Hezbollah also coerced the United 
States and Western Europe to modify their policies towards Lebanon and Iran through hostage-
taking and suicide attacks.  Although Iran provided Hezbollah with large subsidies and political 
guidance, its advisors played a negligible role in the development of the tactics that achieved 
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such impressive results.  Rather, the organization’s principal tactics had antecedents during the 
Lebanese Civil War and were developed by veterans of that conflict. 
 
The Battle for the Security Zone (1985-2000) 
While Israel’s 1985 withdrawal from much of Lebanon constituted an incontrovertible 
success for Hezbollah, it paradoxically challenged the organization’s future viability.  Before 
1985, many of Hezbollah’s military successes had been achieved either in urban environments, 
where force protection was particularly challenging for the Israelis or against the supply 
convoys that supported their overextended forces.  The ‘security zone’ that the Israelis occupied 
after 1985 mitigated the vulnerabilities that Hezbollah hitherto exploited, yet still sought to 
occupy enough Lebanese territory to protect northern Israel from guerrilla raids.  As will be 
shown, Hezbollah responded to this challenge with administrative reforms that improved its 
ability to foster incremental, decentralized innovations.  Facilitated by these reforms, Hezbollah 
cadres continuously developed two tactics with antecedents in Lebanon’s Civil War—small 
unit ‘storming’ raids and roadside ambushes using improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—to 
inflict a steady stream of casualties on Israeli forces and their Lebanese allies, leading some 
analysts to refer to southern Lebanon as Israel’s Vietnam.89 
Designed by Israeli strategists to stymy Hezbollah’s military campaign, the security 
zone comprised 850 km² or 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory.90  Bereft of large urban centers, 
the zone was rural, mountainous and marked by scattered villages.  Living within this zone was 
a large Christian community, whose militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), the Israelis built 
into a sizeable anti-guerrilla force that one veteran analyst described as “a well-knit little army” 
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in the mid-1980s.91  With 2,500-3,000 members of the SLA and 1,000 Israeli troops to control 
a region populated by only 100,000 inhabitants, Israel possessed a much better force-to-
population ration than hitherto the case.  In the eyes of Israeli planners, regular patrols within 
the zone, a string of hilltop fortresses at the zone’s edge and targeted assassinations outside the 
zone would stymie Hezbollah. 
Israeli commanders’ calculations appeared vindicated for several years.  Indeed, 
Hezbollah only intermittently attacked the zone during the five years following Israel’s 1985 
retreat.  Instead, Hezbollah spent these years embroiled in a low-intensity “gangster style of 
war” with the Lebanese Communist Party (1985-86), clashes with Syrian forces in Beirut 
(1987), and a fratricidal war with its Shiite rival, Amal (1988-90).92  Consequently, Hezbollah 
was unable to concentrate on attacking the security zone until it had terminated its internecine 
conflicts with Lebanese actors and reached a modus vivendi with Syria. 
When Hezbollah began attacking the zone in 1990, its cadres’ existing tactics rapidly 
proved unsuitable to the new campaign.  Hezbollah’s most dramatic tactic from the 1980s—
suicide bombing—proved of limited utility because checkpoints rendered it difficult to sneak 
suicide car bombs into the zone and the only available targets—hilltop forts and convoys—
yielded few casualties.  Consequently, Hezbollah only launched three such attacks in the 1990s, 
which proved comparatively disappointing.  Likewise, Hezbollah’s leaders discovered that 
most of their fighters, who were accustomed to launching hit-and-run attacks from the 
apartment blocks, alleyways and basements of large cities, were unprepared for the security 
zone, where fortified hilltop outposts barred their way into wooded hills. 
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At first, Hezbollah fighters cast tactical subtlety aside, charging the hilltop forts frontally 
and in broad daylight with groups of up to 200 fighters.93  Not surprisingly, attacks launched 
uphill, across minefields and into machinegun fire sacrificed combatants to little end.  As one 
Israeli intelligence officer observed “they [Hezbollah] failed every time.”94  To make matters 
worse, the fact that many Hezbollah fighters resided in Beirut and the Beka’a Valley meant that 
every offensive was preceded by combatants driving to the front in cars, motorcycles and 
scooters.  Israeli intelligence invariably detected these movements and forewarned outposts that 
an attack was coming.95  Employing crude tactics and bereft of surprise, Hezbollah lost five of 
its own fighters for every enemy killed in 1990.96 
Hezbollah’s governing body, its Shura (Council), quickly grasped that its tactics 
generated an exchange rate that the organization could not sustain.  However, rather than dictate 
new tactics from above, the Shura empowered field commanders to improve their tactics in a 
decentralized fashion.  As part of this reform, Hezbollah’s military wing was segregated from 
the rest of the organization and henceforth answered only to the organization’s secretary 
general. In principle, the Secretary General, who is a cleric by training, issues only broad 
directives and leaves operational and tactical decisions to military commanders themselves. 
To provide expert direction for Hezbollah’s military campaign, the Shura established a 
Jihad Council, composed of seasoned field commanders.  The Fatah-veteran Mughniyah was 
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appointed to chair this body in 1993 and remained in this position until his 2008 assassination.97  
However, while the Jihad Council provided strategic guidance, field commanders were 
accorded considerable autonomy to plan and conduct operations on their own initiative.  
Initially, southern Lebanon was divided into three sectors, each with its own commander.  Later, 
a fourth independent command was created for Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket forces.98  Thus, 
the operational and tactical direction of Hezbollah’s military campaign was delegated to field 
commanders, with the Jihad Council playing a coordinating function by distilling and diffusing 
lessons within the organization. 
Hezbollah’s military reorganization was initiated by Secretary General Abbas al-
Musawi in 1991 and was pursued after his 1992 assassination by his successor, Nasrallah.  
Explaining the rationale for Hezbollah’s new command structure, Nasrallah stated that, 
The real credit in the development of the resistance is for its military cadres, and 
these people had their experiences under constant development.  When I became 
secretary general… these cadres had become more experienced and their 
knowledge was greater [than their political superiors].  My job was to strengthen 
the ties between these brothers….  It was quite natural for the improvement of the 
resistance.99 
 
Thus, by enhancing military commanders’ autonomy vis-à-vis their political superiors, and 
improving communications links between individual military cadres, Hezbollah’s Shura 
improved the organization’s potential for decentralized military innovation.   
The reorganization Hezbollah’s military wing quickly generated results.  Indeed, Israeli 
commanders soon recognized that Hezbollah tactics were incrementally, yet continuously 
evolving.  One Israeli general stated with alarm that Hezbollah “was learning the modus 
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operandi of the IDF and were improving from incident to incident.”100  Another general 
observed after the campaign that, “Hezbollah is a learning organization.  They would debrief 
[and draw lessons] after every operation.”101  As a result of Hezbollah’s focus on continuous 
incremental improvement, its exchange ratio steadily improved.  As illustrated by Figure 2, 
whereas Hezbollah lost five combatants for every Israeli/SLA soldier killed in 1990, it only lost 
two in 1991 and 1.7 in 1992.102  Thereafter, the exchange ratio continued to evolve in 





This dramatic improvement in Hezbollah’s military effectiveness can largely be attributed to 
the continuous incremental, yet decentralized refinement of two tactics—hit-and-run ‘storming’ 
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Figure 2: 
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raids on hilltop positions and roadside improvised explosive device (IED) attacks—that had 
important antecedents in the Lebanese Civil War. 
Although Hezbollah’s mass assaults on hilltop forts were an unqualified failure, the forts 
remained an enticing target.  The fact that enemy forces were concentrated in the forts meant 
that these positions would offer Hezbollah a convenient means of applying pressure on Israeli 
and SLA forces once its military leaders developed appropriate tactics for attacking them.  To 
this end, Hezbollah’s sector commanders began adapting the Civil War urban tactics known as 
the ‘storming’ raid to the struggle against the outposts.  During storming raids small combat 
groups of 4-5 men attacked apartment blocks by surprise and relied on the tightly integrated use 
of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), assault rifles and machine guns to suppress defenders’ 
responses.  Storming raids generally lasted a matter of minutes and aimed to inflict casualties 
and demoralize opponents, rather than conquer territory.104 
While the storming raid provided a template for attacking outposts, Hezbollah’s leaders 
understood that changes in planning, fieldcraft and weapons handling skills were needed to 
adapt the tactic to southern Lebanon.  To achieve surprise, commanders now trained their men 
to stealthily creep up Lebanese mountains and insisted that they wear camouflaged uniforms, 
rather than jeans and T-shirts overlaid with webbing.105  To conceal preparations for attacks, 
Hezbollah also began digging small tunnels near SLA outposts where its fighters could store 
equipment and rest prior to attacking.106  Likewise, field commanders created special 
reconnaissance patrols to generate better intelligence on the forts’ weaknesses by creeping close 
to the forts at night and establishing camouflaged observation posts.  From the mid-1990s, these 
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patrols employed night vision equipment and video cameras to improve their intelligence 
collection capabilities.107  These concealment and surveillance techniques increasingly enabled 
Hezbollah squads to strike the SLA without warning where it was weakest and least alert. 
At the same time as improving assault preparations, Hezbollah commanders 
continuously incorporated new weapons into their storming raids.  Within this context, 
Hezbollah began using a primitive anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), the Soviet 1960s-era AT-
3 in late-1992.  Although the AT-3 had been used by the PLO in the early-1980s and was 
already obsolete as an anti-tank weapon, Hezbollah used it to attack forts’ vulnerable points, 
where its large warhead and 3 km range (compared to 200 m for RPGs) made it a useful addition 
to Hezbollah assaults.108  From the mid-1990s onwards, Hezbollah also began to support the 
squad conducting a storm raid with indirect fire from a second squad located around 5 km away.  
Equipped with mortars, this second squad would bombard the outpost during the first squad’s 
attack and also cover its withdrawal.109  Eventually, Hezbollah expanded on its use of indirect 
mortar and Katyusha rocket fire by bombarding one outpost while a raiding party attacked 
another, and by harassing outposts between major operations to ‘keep the pot boiling’ in the 
words of a senior UNIFIL official.110 
By continually refining its basic storming raid tactic, Hezbollah augmented both the 
sophistication and volume of its anti-outpost attacks.  In late-1992 Hezbollah succeeded in 
simultaneously attacking eleven outposts, demonstrating a new ability to coordinate disparate 
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units’ actions.111  In October 1994, an attack by several squads, totaling 20 fighters, was so 
successful at suppressing a fort’s defenses that its 70 Israeli defenders either fled or cowered in 
underground bunkers, enabling Hezbollah fighters raise their flag atop the position.112  By 1997 
Hezbollah was able to sustain simultaneous attacks on five outposts for a period of three hours, 
before exfiltrating under the cover of darkness.113  As a result of its improving anti-fort tactics, 
below, Hezbollah’s overall volume of attacks, of which attacks on outposts were the most 
common, increased dramatically from under 20 in 1990 to over 1,500 in 1998 (as illustrated by 
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Although most caused few casualties, Hezbollah’s incessant attacks undermined the SLA’s 
morale.  Veteran soldiers began deserting in significant numbers in 1995 and recruits became 
so hard to find that the SLA’s leadership was forced to use press gangs to fill its ranks despite 
the tripling of its soldiers’ salaries between 1990 and 1996.115  Driven by Hezbollah attacks and 
its own crumbling morale, the SLA abandoned 25 percent of its outposts in 1999.116 
Although assaults on outposts constituted the quantitatively most significant element in 
Hezbollah’s campaign against the security zone, its most lethal tactic was attacks with 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  Throughout the 1990s roadside, IEDs accounted for half 
to two-thirds of Israeli losses in the security zone.117  Despite their lethality, IEDs were nothing 
new to Lebanon and had been employed by Amal during the 1970s and Hezbollah as early as 
1983.118  Indeed, Hezbollah commanders with prior IED experience almost certainly introduced 
the devices into the security zone.119  However, what distinguished Hezbollah’s new IED 
campaign from those preceding it was the pace of innovation.  Hidden workshops employed 
commercially-available civil technologies to continuously improve Hezbollah’s ability to 
conceal and detonate IEDs.  Likewise, sector commanders incrementally improved the 
techniques whereby they infiltrated IED teams to targets and then employed IEDs to inflict 
maximum damage.120 
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Hezbollah’s first IEDs were crude and consisted of little more than explosive charges 
connected by wires to detonators.  However, Hezbollah’s fighters soon discovered that 
decorative fiberglass ‘rocks’ sold in gardening stores provided ideal concealment for 
explosives.121  Then, in late-1991, Hezbollah began detonating IEDs by radio control, which 
precluded the need for easily-detectable detonating wires.  However, as casualties mounted, 
Israel developed countermeasures to curb the IED threat.  For example, Israeli forces responded 
to radio-detonation by sweeping a wide spectrum of radio frequencies with high-powered 
transmitters and flying electronic reconnaissance aircraft over southern Lebanon.122   
Nonplussed, Hezbollah’s IED workshops responded to Israeli countermeasures with 
counter-countermeasures, inaugurating a contest that one author has characterized as “a 
technological war of wits between Hezbollah’s bomb-making engineers and the IDF.”123  For 
Hezbollah’s part, this race saw the group sequentially introduce detonation by: computerized 
multi-frequency radio transmission (1993), cellular phone receivers (1995), and photo-electric 
devices (1997).124  Likewise, when Israel reinforced the armor on its vehicles, Hezbollah 
responded in 1998 by introducing a new form of IED, explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs), 
which could better penetrate Israeli armored vehicles.125 
Hezbollah’s continuously-improving IEDs were complemented by incremental 
improvements to how they employed them.  For example, field commanders came to favor road 
cuttings and overhangs since these features force convoys to bunch-up, increasing their 
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vulnerability to IEDs.126  To maximize the damage inflicted on convoys, Hezbollah also began 
to lay strings of IEDs, extending the lethal area of an IED ambush to up to 60 m along a road’s 
length.127  After analyzing Israeli reactions to their attacks, some Hezbollah commanders started 
laying pairs of IEDs with a so-called ‘seven minute’ trigger on the second device.  When an 
enemy patrol detonated the first IED, its explosion automatically triggered a timer on a second 
nearly IED, detonating it after seven minutes, when the survivors of the first attack began to 
treat their casualties.128  When Israel attempted to use thermal cameras to detect Hezbollah’s 
nighttime movements IED teams, the latter resorted to neoprene diving suites to hide their 
thermal signatures.129    
Hezbollah’s growing skill at building and using IEDs killed an increasing number of 
Israeli and SLA soldiers, and damaged the morale of both forces.  To stem their losses, Israeli 
forces reduced their patrolling activities in the security zone beginning in 1994 and attempted 
to substitute increased SLA patrols for their own declining effort.130  However, this policy 
backfired because it rendered it easier for Hezbollah’s IED teams to infiltrate the security zone 
and demoralized SLA soldiers who felt that their lives were being sacrificed to reduce Israeli 
casualties.  All the while, as illustrated by figure 4 below, Israel’s annual losses more than 
tripled between 1993 and 1997 as a result of the IED campaign.131  Even the decline in Israeli 
casualties after 1998 represents not so much progress in combatting the IED threat than the 
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decision to increasingly target the already-crumbling SLA, which lost 45 soldiers in 1998 
compared to only 23 the previous year.132  
 
   
 









Perhaps more significant than the numbers of Israeli soldiers they killed, Hezbollah’s IED 
campaign was fraying Israeli forces’ morale and discipline.  Among the disturbing trends was 
a 50 percent increase in soldiers seeking psychological help in the mid-1990s and the 1997 
mutiny of an infantry company told they would be deployed to Lebanon.133  By 1998, the 
mounting death toll had convinced many Israelis, including certain generals, to call for a 
unilateral withdrawal from the security zone.134 
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By May 2000, Hezbollah’s campaign against the security zone had convinced Israeli 
policymakers that their best course of action was to unilaterally withdraw.  With the SLA 
crumbling, Israeli units demoralized and Hezbollah constantly improving, any attempt to 
continue holding the zone was likely to result in a greater investment of resources in a conflict 
whose outcome was increasingly dubious.  As if to emphasize its deteriorating position, Israel’s 
attempt to stage an orderly withdrawal to the Israeli border degenerated into headlong flight as 
the SLA disintegrated and Hezbollah militants led villagers to overrun their camps and seize 
hastily-abandoned equipment.135  In their failed campaign for the security zone, between 1985 
and 2000, Israel lost 244 soldiers and the SLA another 410.136  As demonstrated, Hezbollah 
achieved this result through the continuous incremental refinement of two tactics—hit-and-run 
storming raids and roadside IEDs—with which the organization’s cadres were already familiar.  
The institutions that fostered this form of innovation were decentralized and empowered field 
commanders to innovate from the bottom-up. 
 
The 34-Day War (2006) 
By retreating to the international border in 2000, Israel presented Hezbollah with a novel 
military challenge.  Because Hezbollah’s cadres filled the vacuum created by Israel’s 
withdrawal and the SLA’s collapse, Hezbollah suddenly found itself controlling territory along 
Israel’s border and, in the event of an Israeli attack, would either have to defend this territory 
or suffer the indignity of abandoning its Shiite inhabitants.  As will be shown, Hezbollah’s high 
command met this challenge by developing a defensive plan that built on the organization’s 
existing expertise in three military techniques—launching rocket attacks on population centers, 
constructing tunnels to conceal and protect its forces, and defending urban areas with small 
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networked combat groups.  Hezbollah’s plan proved its value in 2006 when Israel responded to 
sporadic cross-border attacks with a large-scale offensive.  By bombarding Israeli towns with 
rockets and by retarding Israeli forces’ advance, Hezbollah persuaded an increasingly-
disillusioned Israeli public to clamor for a ceasefire after 33 days of war. 
When Israel withdrew to its international boundary with Lebanon in 2000, its leaders 
calculated that the move would reduce Hezbollah’s ability to act militarily.137  However, despite 
the obstacles to continuing military operations, Hezbollah’s leadership refused to abandon their 
struggle.  To maximize the political benefits of continuing to fight, while minimizing the risk 
of massive retaliation, Hezbollah leaders claimed they only sought to force Israel to free the 
Lebanese prisoners it detained and withdraw from two miniscule territories whose ownership 
was disputed.138  In keeping with these modest objectives, Hezbollah’s post-2000 military 
campaign was sporadic and averaged only one attack every month, compared with 125 attacks 
per month late in the security zone campaign.139  Until 2006, Hezbollah’s calculations appeared 
sound as Israel refrained from escalating the conflict even after an October 2000 ambush killed 
three Israeli soldiers, whose bodies Hezbollah exchanged for live Lebanese and Palestinian 
prisoners.140  However, Israel surprised Hezbollah by responding with massive force to a similar 
operation conducted on 12 July 2006, which killed ten Israeli soldiers, two of whose bodies 
were abducted.141   
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Over five weeks, Israeli aircraft conducted 15,500 sorties, delivering 12,000 bombs and 
missiles, while Israeli artillery pounded Hezbollah positions with 140,000 artillery 
projectiles.142  When long-range attacks failed to produce results, Israel’s high-command 
ordered ground forces into Lebanon, engaging 30,000 Israeli soldiers by war’s end.  Despite 
the exceptional means Israel employed during this 33-day campaign, Hezbollah frustrated its 
offensive by bombarding Israel’s population centers with rockets and stymying its ground 
forces in urban battles.  Although most post-war analysts attributed Israel’s strategic failure to 
Israeli political and military errors, the fact remains that Hezbollah’s high command confronted 
them with an ingenious centrally-conceived defensive scheme that built incrementally on the 
organization’s expertise with rockets, small group tactics and tunnels.143   
Hezbollah’s strategy for responding to an Israeli offensive depended on firing rockets 
at population centers to coerce Israel’s government into accepting a ceasefire.  Underlying this 
strategy was a belief that Hezbollah’s rockets could force Israel’s government to abandon its 
war aims and curtail its military operations by inflicting civilian casualties, damaging property 
and disrupting normal life.  However, as Hamas’ failed Qassem rocket campaign demonstrates, 
Hezbollah would only succeed if it was capable of launching enough rockets to inflict 
significant damage and continue to fire them despite Israel’s countermeasures.  In the years 
preceding 2006, Hezbollah’s cadres incrementally, yet systematically developed precisely these 
capabilities.    
Rocket attacks on Israel were far from a novelty in 2006 and had a history extending 
back to 1968 when Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon began using Soviet-designed 
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122mm ‘Katyusha’ rockets to bombard Israeli towns.144  Designed in the late-1950s, Katyushas 
were mediocre battlefield weapons because they were inaccurate and possessed a range of only 
21 km.145  However, Katyushas’ light weight (they could be transported by two men or a 
donkey) and fact that they could be launched from hard-to-detect disposable launchers were 
redeeming qualities that appealed to insurgent groups.146   
Because of prior experience working for Palestinian guerrillas, many Hezbollah cadres 
were already veteran Katyusha operators when they joined the organization.  However, 
experience with Katyusha tactics was accompanied by an awareness of their strategic 
drawbacks.  In fact, Hezbollah’s leaders judged the Palestinian Katyusha campaign strategically 
counterproductive.  By unexpectedly bombarding Israeli towns with Katyushas, Palestinian 
guerrillas drove Israelis to demand that their government retaliate.  Consequently, Israel 
responded to most Katyusha attacks by bombarding Lebanese villages, yet went so far as 
invading Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.147  This dynamic, whereby Katyushas inflicted light 
damage on Israel, but provoked massive retaliation against southern Lebanon, drove the 
region’s Shiite inhabitants to turn on the Palestinians and galvanized Israel into finally evicting 
them from the region in 1982.148   
The Palestinian precedent, whereby Katyushas provoked retaliatory attacks and 
aggravated relations with south Lebanon’s inhabitants, led Hezbollah’s leadership to use the 
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rockets cautiously.  Consequently, although Hezbollah acquired Katyushas in the mid-1980s, 
they refrained from attacking targets in Israel for half a decade.149  This policy only changed in 
1992 when Hezbollah field commanders disobeyed orders and launched Katyushas at Israeli 
towns in retaliation for Israel’s killing Secretary General al-Musawi and his family.150  
Although unauthorized, these attacks catalyzed the development of Hezbollah’s ‘rocket 
doctrine,’ whereby the organization would retaliate for Israel’s use of heavy weapons against 
Hezbollah targets in Lebanese towns by bombarding Israeli towns with Katyushas.   
Hezbollah hoped this doctrine would deter Israel from employing its overwhelming 
advantages in airpower and artillery and, should deterrence fail, Hezbollah planned to launch 
Katyushas to coerce Israel into accepting ceasefires.  Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah 
articulated the new doctrine in 1992, declaring, “We have to work towards creating a situation 
where the enemy is subject to our conditions.  We should tell him ‘If you attack us [with heavy 
weaponry] we will use our Katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our Katyushas.  
We will, however, keep fighting you as an occupier.’”151  The panic caused by the small 
numbers of Iraqi missiles that struck Israel during the 1991 Gulf War arguably encouraged 
Hezbollah along this path by emphasizing Israel’s supposed psychological vulnerability.152  
To succeed, however, Hezbollah’s rocket doctrine needed to be backed-up by the ability 
to maintain a high volume of Katyusha attacks regardless of Israeli efforts to suppress the 
rockets.  Initially, Hezbollah cadres reemployed the Palestinian guerrillas’ techniques for 
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setting-up and launching Katyushas.  However, an Israeli air and artillery offensive revealed 
shortcomings in Hezbollah’s use of rockets in July 1993.  In an offensive suggestively named 
Operation Accountability, Israel’s armed forces targeted Lebanese villages—inflicting $29 
million in damage and creating 300,000 refugees—to turn their inhabitants against Hezbollah 
and coerce Lebanon’s government into cracking down on the organization.153 
As threatened, Hezbollah responded by launching Katyushas.  However, although 
Hezbollah fired 300 rockets over seven days, which helped pressure Israel into accepting a 
ceasefire, the operation revealed grave deficiencies in Hezbollah’s rocket forces.154  For 
example, poor training in ballistic calculations meant that nearly half the rockets launched failed 
to reach Israeli territory.  To make matters worse, Hezbollah fighters were surprised by the 
sophistication of Israeli counterbattery radars, which enabled Israeli forces to locate the 
positions Katyushas were launched from and respond with artillery.155  In Operation 
Accountability’s aftermath, Hezbollah’s military cadres addressed these problems and 
improved their overall performance.  As Secretary General Nasrallah later admitted, “July 1993 
[Operation Accountability] was a very good lesson for us as far as confronting this kind of 
aggression is concerned because we pinpointed our strengths and weaknesses.”156 
In response to Operation Accountability’s lessons, Hezbollah divided rocket launches 
into two distinct sets of procedures, which were executed by separate squads.  One squad, 
comprised of full-time combatants, would set up the launch tube and ensure that it was properly 
aimed.  Then, the second squad would transport and fire the rocket.  To avoid Israeli retaliatory 
artillery fire, Hezbollah pioneered the use of inexpensive wristwatch and battery timers to delay 
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the rocket launchers until Hezbollah’s launch teams could escape from the area.157  Hezbollah’s 
improved rocket tactics were exhibited in 1996, when Israel initiated another large-scale air 
offensive, code-named Grapes of Wrath, designed to punish Hezbollah and coerce Lebanon’s 
government into cracking down on the organization.  During this 16-day conflict, Hezbollah 
launched 777 Katyushas, which drove 10,000 Israelis from their homes, and sustained their 
rocket barrage despite Israeli efforts to stop them.158  
Hezbollah continued improving its rocket tactics following Grapes of Wrath.  In a move 
that the former director of Israel’s Missile Defense Organization characterized as 
“counterintuitive yet brilliant,” Hezbollah engineers improvised multi-barreled Katyusha 
launchers out of steel tubes and concrete, which they installed in well-camouflaged concrete 
bunkers.159  Because the tubes were aimed at predetermined targets during peacetime, rather 
than hastily installed during wartime, Katyushas fired from these stationary launchers were 
more accurate than those fired by mobile launch teams.  Moreover, by using multi-barreled 
launchers, Hezbollah dramatically increased the volume of rockets it could fire.  Indeed, Israeli 
analysts calculated that 40 to 150 stationary launchers fired most Hezbollah rockets in 2006.160 
In addition to developing stationary multi-barreled Katyusha launchers, Hezbollah’s 
military cadres also improved other facets of the organization’s rocket force.  For example, 
Hezbollah introduced increasingly diverse platforms for launching Katyushas, employing both 
mobile launch teams and improvised launchers on pickup trucks to supplement the stationary 
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launchers.161  Hezbollah also integrated longer-range rockets, with diameters between 200mm 
and 610mm and ranges from 35 to 200 km, into its arsenal.  Provided by Iran and Syria, these 
new rockets offered Hezbollah the ability to strike Israeli targets hitherto unreachable, while 
simultaneously complicating Israel’s rocket suppression task because longer ranges meant that 
rockets could hit Israel from a wider range of launching zones.   
The 2006 war revealed the cumulative impact of Hezbollah’s incremental development 
of its rocket capabilities.  As illustrated in Figure 5, Hezbollah’s improvements to its launching 
procedures and technologies enabled the organization to increase the volume of rockets it fired, 












In addition to being able to launch increasing number of rockets, Hezbollah’s rocket units’ 
adroit use of concealment, mobility and decoys thwarted Israel’s hi-tech effort to destroy its 
rockets.  Indeed, judging by the intensity of Hezbollah’s 2006 rocket campaign, Israel utterly 
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failed to suppress Hezbollah’s launchers, which launched as many rockets daily at the end of 
the war then at the beginning.163  As a consequence, as illustrated in Figure 6, Israel’s 
willingness to conduct longer campaigns was matched by Hezbollah launching correspondingly 













During the most recent conflict, Hezbollah demonstrated that it had developed rocket 
capabilities capable of significantly disrupting Israel’s economy and society by launching 4,000 
rockets in 31 days (there was a two-day ceasefire during the 33-day war). 
While rockets were the key to Hezbollah’s strategy for disrupting an Israeli offensive, 
it could only implement this strategy if it could thwart an Israeli ground offensive.  Because 90 
percent of Hezbollah’s rockets were short-range Katyushas, Israeli ground forces could 
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dramatically curtail Hezbollah’s attacks by advancing 20 km into Lebanon.164  Hezbollah 
responded to this threat by building on its prior experience with small, autonomous combat 
groups and the construction of tunnels.  The development and artful synthesis of these long-
standing capabilities stymied Israeli operations to such an extent that some Western military 
theorists saw Hezbollah’s performance as a harbinger of deadly future ‘hybrid’ or ‘professional’ 
networked irregular’ wars.165 
As preceding sections demonstrate, semi-autonomous combat groups had long been 
central to Hezbollah tactics, whether operating as urban guerrillas in the 1980s or launching 
‘storming’ raids in the 1990s.  Hezbollah spent the years prior to 2006 adapting its small group 
tactics to the defense of southern Lebanon’s towns.  Hezbollah’s military leadership, which was 
dominated by veterans of the Civil War’s urban battles, concluded that the best way of thwarting 
an invasion was bogging Israeli ground forces down in urban warfare.  However, while urban 
warfare could neutralize Israeli forces’ firepower advantage, Hezbollah veterans who had 
fought alongside Palestinian groups (including Mughniya and al-Khalil) knew that overly-
centralized urban defenses would collapse.   
Indeed, large well-supplied Palestinian units disintegrated in Tyre and Sidon in 1982 
because their highly-centralized command structures could not cope with the pace of combat.166  
Consequently, Hezbollah’s high command concluded that small units needed to be able to fight 
without guidance or logistics support from higher headquarters.  To this end, Hezbollah 
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organized its part-time reservists into autonomous combat groups of 7-10 fighters, which were 
assigned distinct sectors to defend in their home towns.167  The commanders of these combat 
groups were given considerable leeway to make rapid tactical decisions and fight their 
individual defensive battles as they saw fit.168  With multiple combat groups’ interlocking 
sectors constituting a coherent system covering each town, Hezbollah’s defenses have been 
characterized as “a network of autonomous cells [i.e. combat groups] with little inter-cell 
systemic interaction.”169 
Tactically, Hezbollah’s combat groups adapted the weapons and techniques they had 
perfected during the security zone campaign to their new urban defense mission.  As had always 
been true of Hezbollah units, most fighters continued using assault rifles and RPGs.  However, 
Hezbollah commanders also continued to build on their experience in the security zone by 
integrating increasing quantities of direct attacks from anti-tank missiles and indirect fire from 
mortars into their operations.170  For example, Hezbollah’s urban combat groups were amply 
supplied and well-trained to use the AT-3 anti-tank missile to strike urban targets.171  Although 
obsolete for their original mission of hunting tanks, these old missiles became the ‘main fear’ 
of Israeli infantrymen because their large warheads could transform the buildings where Israeli 
troops sheltered from small arms fire into deathtraps.172  In another example of expanding on 
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its prior experience, Hezbollah made considerable and accurate use of mortars in 2006 to 
support its combat groups.173 
To enhance its combat groups’ ability to wage urban battles and enable other fighters to 
protect stationary rocket launchers, Hezbollah’s engineers improved upon the organization’s 
long history of tunnel-building to develop an extensive, elaborate and well-concealed network 
of bunkers and tunnels.  During the Lebanese Civil War all sides built tunnels and underground 
bunkers in the zones they controlled, which oftentimes enabled outnumbered defenders to halt 
offensives launched by superior attackers.174  Indeed, tunnels and bunkers enabled: Palestinian 
fighters to long oppose the 1975-76 Christian assault on Tel Zaatar, Christian militias to 
frustrate the 1978 Syrian offensive on Ashrafiyeh, and Palestinian groups to offer their most 
significant resistance to Israel’s 1982 invasion.175   
Consequently, it was only natural that Hezbollah’s cadres, who were themselves Civil 
War veterans, would resort to tunneling as well.  Our interviews reveal that local commanders 
began building their first tunnels on the outskirts of Israel’s security zone in the late-1980s.  
Although the tunnels were initially conceived of merely as places to conceal arms, sector 
commanders continuously expanded and improved them.  Indeed, by the end of the security 
zone campaign, Hezbollah’s tunnel complexes had achieved a high degree of sophistication, 
with invisible entrances located on hills’ reverse slopes linked by underground passages to 
concealed fighting positions on their forward slopes.176  
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Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah’s engineers studied foreign tunneling techniques to 
improve their tunnel and bunker designs.  One source of inspiration was the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), which built tunnels massive 
enough to accommodate trucks in the 1970s, yet whose indiscreet construction techniques 
invited destructive air raids.177  North Korea was another source of tunnel-building techniques.  
North Korean military engineers historically excelled at designing underground bunker systems 
and purportedly advised Hezbollah personnel.178  Finally, Hezbollah also studied the National 
Liberation Front’s tunnel networks from the Vietnam War.179  When questioned about the 
eclectic influences on Hezbollah’s tunnel-building advances, a senior Hezbollah official 
admitted that the organization had sought innovative ideas from every possible source.180  
Combining their prior experience with foreign inputs, Hezbollah built underground 
tunnel and bunker networks unrivaled in the modern Middle East.  For example, Hezbollah 
built 600 ammunition and weapons bunkers to enable its combat groups to fight autonomously 
of one another.  By providing each combat group with three bunkers whose locations were 
known only to its members, Hezbollah planners calculated that units could keep fighting even 
if Israeli forces destroyed or overran one or two bunkers.181  Underneath strategic towns, these 
supply bunkers were oftentimes integrated into elaborate tunnel systems, whose multiple 
entrances and strategically-placed CCTV cameras enabled Hezbollah fighters to stage 
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sophisticated ambushes.182  Hezbollah also built massive fighting positions in rural locations 
that Israeli soldiers euphemistically referred to as ‘nature reserves’ to provide close-in defenses 
for its stationary multi-barreled Katyusha launchers.183  Unlike its early tunnels, many of these 
fortifications featured reinforced concrete, steel blast-doors, electricity and running water.   
The impact of Hezbollah’s incremental improvement on its preexisting expertise with 
rockets, combat groups and tunnels was dramatically revealed in 2006.  As planned, Hezbollah 
initiated a rocket campaign of unparalleled volume and sophistication in response to Israel’s 
offensive.  Over the next 33 days, Hezbollah’s rockets killed 53 Israelis, severely wounded 250 
and damaged or destroyed 6,000 buildings.184  To make matters worse, Hezbollah’s use of 
camouflage, decoys and well-protected launchers thwarted Israeli efforts to destroy its 
launchers, enabling Hezbollah to sustain its rocket barrage until war’s end.185  Consequently, 
300,000 Israelis fled their homes and 40 percent of northern Israel’s businesses temporarily 
closed, generating $5.5 billion in economic losses.186 
When Israeli ground forces began advancing on 17 July, they swiftly encountered well-
prepared defenses in towns and the ‘nature preserves’ housing Hezbollah’s rockets.  Indeed, 
Hezbollah’s nature reserves’ concealed tunnel and bunker complexes came as a surprise to 
Israeli troops and repulsed their initial attacks.  Faced with setbacks, the Israeli high command 
concluded after 10 days of combat that “a nature reserve can swallow an entire [Israeli] 
battalion” and issued instructions to avoid attacking them.187  As a result, Hezbollah’s stationary 
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Katyusha launchers were able to continue firing rocket even when surrounded.188  When Israeli 
forces advanced into towns, the reservists comprising Hezbollah’s urban combat groups 
exploited their tunnel networks to stymy their advance.  Engaging in extended short-range 
firefights, many Hezbollah combat groups held their ground for 5 to 12 hours against vastly 
superior forces.  Consequently, individual towns and villages delayed the Israeli advance for 
days at a time, with Marun a’Ras resisting for seven days, Bint Jubayl for over four, 
Ghunduriyah for two and Tayyibah for one.189 
Surprised by Hezbollah’s effective ground defenses and undiminished ability to launch 
rockets, Israeli policymakers agreed to an armistice after 31 days of combat.  By the time the 
armistice entered into effect 60 hours later, Hezbollah had lost approximately 250 combatants 
to Israel’s 119.190  For a violent non-state organization to perform so well fighting defensively 
against a regional power is a rare accomplishment.  Hezbollah achieved this result by 
incrementally and artfully building on the organization’s tactical repertoire.  Indeed, the 
defining characteristics of Hezbollah’s campaign—unguided rockets, small combat groups and 
tunnels—had been employed by the organization long before 2006.  However, the nature of 
Hezbollah’s improvement on these tactics suggests that the organization’s pursuit of innovation 
was more centralized and top-down than ever before.  In fact, only a centralized program of 
studying foreign fortifications could have produced the standardized fortifications, 
incorporating North Korean and Vietnamese techniques, the Israelis encountered in 2006.  
Thus, while Hezbollah’s innovation remained incremental in nature, the innovative process was 
more centralized than had previously been the case. 
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If Hezbollah is symptomatic of other organizations of its ilk, our examination of this 
case has powerful implications for our understanding of how violent non-state actors develop 
new capabilities.  Within this context, we found that Hezbollah predominantly enhanced its 
military power via incremental innovation.  However, the fact that Hezbollah and other violent 
non-state actors engage in incremental innovation in no way signifies that their innovations are 
less impactful than the discontinuous innovations that states can pursue.   
Indeed, as demonstrated, incremental innovation enabled Hezbollah to maintain and 
improve its combat effectiveness vis-à-vis an Israeli adversary that pursued both discontinuous 
and incremental innovations.  While all Hezbollah innovation was incremental, the dynamics 
that generated innovations evolved over time.  Field commanders in direct contact with enemy 
forces developed innovations in a bottom-up fashion throughout most of Hezbollah’s existence.  
The Jihad Council then diffused locally-successful innovations throughout the organization.  
However, the transition from a continuous conflict to more episodic confrontations later led 
Hezbollah to adopt a more centralized and top-down approach.      
At base, Hezbollah’s military successes are a product of the organization’s ability to 
incrementally improve on certain core military tactics.  Consequently, even those capabilities 
that appeared the most dramatic to outside observers, such as the group’s early use of suicide 
car bombs and later reliance of underground fortifications, were evolutionary developments of 
techniques that Hezbollah’s cadres were long familiar with.  In other areas, such as the 
organization’s continuous refinement of autonomous combat group tactics, the incrementality 
of Hezbollah’s innovation is even more apparent.  However, despite their resolutely incremental 
character, the net effect of Hezbollah’s innovations was a consistent ability to inflict casualties 
on Israel’s armed forces, despite the latter’s best efforts to counter to Hezbollah’s tactics.     
58 
 
Although this study focuses on one particularly successful organization, there are strong 
reasons for anticipating that its lessons about how violent non-state groups innovate can be 
applied much more widely.  In fact, our findings mirror the empirical accounts presented in 
recent historic studies of the Irish Republican Army (1919-22) and the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (1969-97).191  In these cases, as with Hezbollah, incremental innovation 
proved critical for combating conventional armed forces’ superior resources.  When weighed 
against violent non-state actors’ proven ability to innovate incrementally, there is little evidence 
that such groups can innovate discontinuously. 
Indeed, even highly-competent violent non-state actors routinely fail to achieve 
discontinuous innovations.  For example, technologically-savvy groups such as Aum Shinrikyo 
and the PFLP-GC failed to generate the sought-after capabilities despite significant investments 
in discontinuous innovation.  Less well known, but more significant, even Hezbollah failed on 
three occasions to develop discontinuous innovations.192  During the 1990s, Hezbollah devoted 
high-quality personnel and significant resources to create an elite unit of frogmen trained to 
infiltrate behind Israeli lines and sabotage ships.193  Hezbollah also acquired ultra-light aircraft 
for raiding targets within Israel during this period.194  Most recently, Hezbollah acquired 
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unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and trained its personnel to use them against installations 
deep within Israel.195   
However, compared to its incremental innovations, none of Hezbollah’s efforts at 
discontinuous innovation can be judged successful.  Timely Israeli countermeasures prevented 
Hezbollah from ever employing its frogmen and ultra-light aircraft.196  Similarly, although 
Hezbollah flew a UAV sortie over Israel in 2004, improved Israeli defenses shot down 
Hezbollah’s UAVs during subsequent efforts to use them to launch attacks (2006) and conduct 
reconnaissance missions (2012).197  Even Hezbollah’s efforts to assimilate shoulder-launched 
surface-to-air missiles for combatting Israeli helicopters largely failed, with Hezbollah 
destroying only one such helicopter in thirty years.198  The lesson to draw from these 
experiences is that incremental innovation offers the best means for violent non-state groups to 
enhance their capabilities.  While a well-organized violent non-state actor can successfully 
compete with states in fielding incremental innovations, even the most powerful groups 
repeatedly fail when it comes to discontinuous innovation. 
While our findings about the incremental nature of violent non-state actor innovations 
are categorical, such is not the case when it comes to the mechanisms that produce innovations.  
During the first two periods we examined, Hezbollah relied on bottom-up organizational 
dynamics.  Indeed, during Hezbollah’s first years innovation occurred via a veritable 
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‘revolution from below’ wherein field commanders disregarded Iranian advisors and instead 
developed tactics based on their prior civil war experience.  Later, during the struggle for the 
‘security zone’, Hezbollah institutionalized this dynamic by devolving control for operations to 
unit commanders based in Southern Lebanon and establishing an overarching Jihad Council to 
disseminate tactical lessons.  Although the data is more fragmentary, Hezbollah’s defensive 
preparations prior to 2006 suggest that its innovative efforts became more centralized during 
this period.   
Such a change in Hezbollah’s pursuit of innovation is perhaps best explained by the 
dichotomy of ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime’ innovation.  So long as Hezbollah was engaged in 
continuous operations against Israel, the most efficacious means of innovating was to endow 
field commanders with the autonomy needed to experiment with new tactics.  When one 
commander or unit developed a technique considered particularly promising, the Jihad Council 
and Hezbollah’s training camps ensured the innovation was diffused.  However, Israel’s 
withdrawal from the security zone in 2000 fundamentally transformed its conflict with 
Hezbollah from one that had been continuous into one that now became episodic.  This, in turn, 
deprived Hezbollah’s field commanders of the ability to test and refine tactics against a ‘live’ 
adversary.  Consequently, Hezbollah’s leadership now relies on a more centralized, top-down 
process for developing and experimenting with tactics. 
These findings have powerful implications for our understanding of how violent non-
state actors innovate.  Whereas policymakers and scholars alike long considered highly-
centralized organizations pursuing discontinuous innovations the most dangerous form of 
violent non-state group, our research demonstrates that such organizations are, in fact, the least 
likely to successfully innovate.  Indeed, based on Hezbollah’s record, the most formidable 
violent non-state actors are actually those that relentlessly pursue incremental innovations in a 
bottom-up fashion.  Since our findings coincide, in part, with those of Oppenheimer and 
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Moghadam, yet contradict much of the literature on non-state actor innovation, scholars should 
arguably examine in greater depth incremental and bottom-up processes within insurgent and 
terrorist groups.199  Moreover, in light of these findings, the putative threat of existing non-state 
actors successfully employing such novel technical means as weapons of mass destruction or 
cyber-warfare appears likely exaggerated.  Contrarily, the danger posed by well-organized non-
state organizations pursuing incremental innovations is quite real and such actors can indeed 
out-innovate well-resourced conventional armed forces.   
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